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Salomon saith: There Is no new thing 
upon the earth. So that as Plato had an 
imagination, that all knowledge was hut 
remembrance; so Salomon giveth his 
sentence, that all novelty is but oblivion.
Francis Bacon, Essays, LVIII
1. Introduction
For a long time, European integration has only occasionally 
and intermittently affected domestic politics, and only in 
a few countries. The near future is likely to see the 
growing impact of this process on forms of political 
representation and patterns of competition, and on national 
political alignments, institutional developments and state 
structures. Whether integration progresses or instead is 
stopped or delayed, the debate over these issues and the 
tensions within each country associated with the differing 
attitudes of individuals, groups and territories are likely 
to produce significant political change.
In the literature on European integration a considerable 
shift in emphasis has occurred, moving from the early 
international relations debates about 'theories of 
international integration' to the most recent emphasis on 
'theories of European policy making' and how this 
increasingly affects areas of domestic policies. 
Eventually, the idea has emerged that, 'policy by policy', 
European integration affects domestic 'politics'. At the 
same time, there is a tendency in Euro-studies to assume 
that the EU is a novelty, departing radically from previous 
forms of political organisation and, as a consequence, that 
very little -- if, indeed, anything at all —  can be 
learned from past historical development. On the contrary, 
however new the European unification process might be, a 
great deal can be learned and conceptualised about its 
future development, its mode of structuring, and its 




























































































large-scale territorial expansion and retrenchment. Such 
learning 1) provides the capacity to structure the problem 
area and 2) allows the appreciation of the continued 
relevance of historical legacies which are likely to extend 
their influence to include contemporary processes.
That the EU, in its present and likely near future 
configuration, is not a state seems obvious to most; that 
it will never become one is more controversial, if we 
consider that it took 400 years for the nineteenth century 
system of states to emerge. Even more disputable is the 
conclusion that historical models of large-scale 
territorial differentiation and retrenchment of the past 
(in this part of the world and in others parts which are 
here disregarded through lack of competence) are of little 
relevance for conceptualising and interpreting the half- 
century of EU development. My contention is that, on the 
contrary, there are interesting insights to be gained from 
the insertion of the processes of EU integration within the 
broader scheme of European development from the collapse of 
the Roman Empire to the formation of modern nation states. 
If the process is not yet fixed in a new structurally 
stable configuration, and if the final outcomes are far 
from clear, the most pressing concern is not to find new 
labels and neologisms 1 to classify its changing morphology 
and interaction pattern, but rather to identity the main 
lines of development which help to clarify the general 
meaning of this historical process and also to discuss its 
possible outcomes.
Classic political development theory raises the following 
questions concerning the EU2 :
1) Is the EU an attempt at state formation? Even if it has 
not progressed through war and acquisition of territory, to 




























































































the EU level and functional transfers are already in 
evidence, this can be defined as a state-formation attempt 
characterised by :
- limited administrative capabilities;
- high regulatory powers in selected fields;
- low fiscal capabilities;
- high juridical capabilities expanding from originally 
defined spheres of competencies.
From the historical point of view, there is nothing 
exceptional or new in this configuration of subsystem 
differentiation and autonomy, and past experiences may help 
to conceptualise the problems which emerge from the given 
configuration.
2) Is the EU an attempt at state formation without nation 
building?
A European 'nation' does not exist; a European identity as 
a 'level' of identity amongst others (national, regional, 
communal) may develop and constitute the basis for building 
some elements of a European citizenship. Yet, an historical 
recollection of how European cultural boundaries came to be 
defined in relation to military, politico-administrative 
and economic boundaries may help to dissipate some of the 
certainty of the German Constitutional Court as to the 
proper sequence of, and relationship between, demos, telos 
and kratos.
3) Is the EU state formation without démocratisation?
Conflict and opposition formation and institutional 
démocratisation were processes occurring within the 
consolidated state and impinging upon its cultural 
'nationalisation'. A. closer consideration of
'démocratisation processes' of the past may clarify our 




























































































EU's internal démocratisation. The concern here is not 
about the normative dimension of the 'democratic deficit' - 
- 'how democratic requirements can be handled within the 
EU'; 'how to establish new types of democratic institutions 
for supra-national policy making'; 'how to "democratise" 
existing decision-making' : before dealing with these 
questions one should be able to conceptualise the types of 
interest differentiation, the corresponding conflict lines, 
and the resulting political oppositions alliances that are 
likely to be stimulated by the process of European 
integration.
This requires concentrating too much on the broader and 
more deeply rooted process of 'political structuring' of 
conflict lines within the newly devised borders of the EU. 
To consider this problem we cannot go shopping for 
empirical evidence of 'euro-groups', 'euro-parties', 'euro­
movements' and the like. We must first speculatively 
conceive of how large-scale territory external boundary 
demarcation and internal institutional development generate 
a process of interest redefinition for individuals, social 
collectivities, membership organisations, corporations and 
bureaucracies. Then we can ask how this new conflict and 
interest re-definition can affect the existing national 
systems of corporate interest representation and of 
electoral political representation. Finally, we can 
extrapolate from this the likelihood that certain political 
forms will represent a lasting step toward the internal 
political structuration of the 'European political system'.
It has been asked how long social groups such as 
proletarians, professionals, consumers, etc., will 
'tolerate such a benevolent hegemony (of the EU) before 
demanding a greater voice'3, and whether some form of 




























































































necessary to have forms of 'européanisation of conflict' 
next to the more orderly process of euro-interest 
representation.4 We need, therefore, to designate the 
general constellation of conflict structures from which the 
threshold of 'toleration' of social collectivities and the 
level of contentious collective action may result. More 
generally, regional identity and regional institutional 
representation, welfare state restructuring, economic 
localism and industrial districting, traditional cleavage 
decline, EU judicial and juridical integration, efforts at 
economic convergence, etc. have been widely studied and 
discussed in the past few years. Less attention has perhaps 
been given at the macro-level to the systemic significance 
of these various phenomena, how they relate one to the 
other, what the general constellation is in which they 
assume their meaning and show their potential implication 
for broader problems of social and systemic integration.
If we define the 'historical macro-constellation' as the 
conceptual framework within which sectoral and subsystemic 
changes acquire their systemic and historical relevance, 
this paper is a beginner's attempt at drawing such a 
historical macro-constellation for the process of building 
the large-scale territory identified with the various terms 
of European Economic communities, European Union, etc. The 
first step —  which is outlined in this paper —  is to 
formulate some theoretical propositions about how processes 
of internal conflict generation and opposition development 
(what I call 'political structuration') relate to the 
processes of boundary demarcation in a large-scale 
territorial polity, and how both relate to the internal 
institutional hierarchy of the same territory. We need at 
least a sketch of a theory of 'political structuring' 
within territories characterised by varying degree of 




























































































far only drafted and left outside the scope of the current 
paper —  link this model to both historical and 
contemporary European development to draw indications about 
potential conflict lines emerging during this new attempt 
at European unification. Finally, the evidence of political 
structuring so far accumulated at the EU level should be 
discussed in this light.
What follows is therefore a preliminary discussion of the 
theoretical framework and conceptual tools of this project.
2. Exit options, boundary building, political structuring
In dealing with the modern form of the state, it is 
customary to recall the threefold Weberian definition of 
any politische Verbände, conceived as a 1) hierarchically 
structured organisation for the maintenance of order; 2) 
within a defined geographical area; 3) through the use and 
the threat of physical coercion5 -- in other words, to 
stress the element of a bounded space, of internal 
organised community and of external strategies of
demarcation through signals of possession or physical 
defence against intruders. This definition has become so 
'common sense' that its implications are often overlooked. 
The Weberian formulation establishes a powerful link 
between the strategies of demarcation of the external 
boundaries of the geographical space or territory, on the 
one hand, and the differentiation of roles in the internal 
organisation of the population occupying the physical 
space, on the other. More generally, a close link is 
posited between the territorial consolidation and the 
internal structuring of the politische Verbände. By 
'internal hierarchical organisational structure' is meant 
the institutional form and the legitimation principle of 




























































































'external territorial control' is meant the distinctions 
and differences in membership rights, privileges and 
obligations between natives and 'foreigners' .
The history of human organisations can largely be read as a 
series of continuous efforts to bring territorial borders 
to correspond and coincide with systemic functional 
boundaries, and to be in line with the consolidated 
socio-political hierarchies within the corresponding 
populations.6 At the same time, we could read the same 
history as the way in which consolidated political 
hierarchies were shaped, reinforced, shaken or destroyed by 
the fate - successful or unsuccessful - of their 
territorial defence. Modern state-making was a form of such 
a process, whose success actually imposed its generalised 
imitation.
Drawing from the original definition, I provisionally 
propose the following scheme for the relationships among 
external boundary demarcation and internal political 
structuring.
(Figure 1 about here)
For the moment I would like to avoid the 'language of 
variables'. This scheme may be read along any of the arrows 
indicated. We might be primarily interested in studying how 
the internal hierarchical order is shaped by the combined 
effect of the existing boundaries and the exit options they 
allow, on the one hand, and the pressure of the existing 
internal political structuring on the other. Alternatively, 
we can shape our questions by wondering how the process of 
























































































































































































strategy of boundary building and exit options of the 
internal hierarchical order. Similarly, both the boundary 
building and the availability of the exit option can be 
read as a function of the other processes. In other words, 
'independent' and 'dependent' variables are not fixed by 
the scheme.
Such a scheme clarifies two points. First, it posits the 
relevance of the network of relationships among these 
aspects. Second, it elucidates the fact that the neat 
distinction between 'external relations' of a territorial 
unit and its internal role differentiation and political 
dynamics -- or to put it differently, the net distinction 
between 'international relations' and 'domestic politics' - 
- is simply the contingent historical result of a specific 
configuration of these relationships: the case in which a 
strongly differentiated internal hierarchical order manages 
to control the external territorial and functional 
boundaries —  and to correspondingly reduce exit options —  
so closely as to insulate domestic,structuring processes 
from external influences. In this process, the internal 
hierarchical order presents itself as the single organising 
principle of the internal domestic structuring and, at the 
same time, as the single autonomous centre for external 
relations. Any deviation from this pure type actually makes 
the distinction between 'foreign' and 'domestic' politics 
of limited, and sometimes misleading, use.
The relationship between exit options, external boundary 
building and internal political structuring is briefly 






























































































Hirschman's great intuition1 has been to: 1) conceive of 
exit and voice as alternative mechanisms for the 
individual's reaction to the performance of the various 
organisations and institutions of which he/she is part; 2) 
establish the negative association between the two, so that 
the opportunities for exit reduce the need or willingness 
to voice, while, on the contrary, the lack of the former 
may enhance the willingness and the need for the latter.
A critical appraisal and a development of his arguments may 
help their adaptation to my goals. Hirschman's concern is 
primarily with decline and deterioration in organisational 
performance and the mechanisms of recovery which exist. 
Exit and voice are analysed in their capacity as mechanisms 
of recuperation. He originally thought that exit mechanisms 
were typical of economic transactions, while voice 
mechanisms were typical of political interactions, where 
the usual alternative to voice is acquiescence or 
indifference rather than exit.
Exit is impersonal -- it avoids costly face to face 
relationships; it is communicated indirectly via 
statistics. Voice, as an attempt to change rather than to 
escape from an objectionable state of affairs, is not a 
private and 'secret' act, but requires articulation of 
critical opinions, personal direct involvement -- it is 
direct and visible, and it exposes the 'voicer'.8
Although there is a clear development in the successive 
writing of Hirschman towards a growing appraisal of the 
role of voice, as a first approximation voice is viewed as 
a residual of exit. Those who do not exit are candidates 
for voice; voice 'feeds on', that is, it is nourished by 




























































































deterioration occurs), or on the lack of opportunity for 
exit. As such the role of voice increases as the 
opportunity for exit declines, up to the point where, 'with 
exit wholly unavailable, voice must carry the entire burden 
of alerting management to its failing',9 Therefore, the 
choice whether or not to exit will often be made in the 
light of the prospect for the effective use of voice. 
Consequently, one can imagine that the decision to voice 
will depend on the prospects of effective exit opportunity. 
In other words, exit and voice are alternatives.
Voice is normally more costly than exit. The time and money 
spent in the attempt to achieve changes in the policies and 
practices of the organisation is high -- much higher than 
exit costs. Given that Hirschman tends to conceive of voice 
as primarily an individual action, he conceives of only one 
case in which the cost imbalance in favour of exit is 
redressed: 'expressive' voice. Under certain conditions, 
voice can be perceived as an end and as an enjoyable 
activity, a benefit and a rewarding experience rather than 
as a cost. This is particularly the case for concern with 
public goods. In this case voice can become less' costly 
than normally thought or expected under normal 
circumstances, and may have 'an occasional edge over 
exit'.10 Beyond this particular case the conditions 
implying the resort to voice when exit is available depend 
upon : 1) the extent to which members are willing to trade 
off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an 
improvement in the deteriorated product; 2) the estimate 
members have of their ability to influence the 
organisation.
Loyalty, the third concept of Hirschman, is seen as 
something which can to a certain extent neutralise the 




























































































the first to exit. In this sense, loyalty is a stimulator 
of voice and decreases the cost of the latter. Moreover, 
loyalty increases the cost of exit. Without loyalty, from 
Hirschman's perspective, exit is essentially costless. At 
the same time, exactly because loyalty postpones exit, its 
very existence is predicated on the possibility of exit. 
Loyalty appears to be a mechanism that, on one side, makes 
exit more costly, and, on the other, makes voice more 
effective. The ability to use voice effectively is 
increased by loyalty. In this sense loyalty is essential to 
the structuring of voice and democracy, for people with 
easy exit opportunities will normally not engage strongly 
in internal voice for improvement. 'Loyalty behaviour, as 
examined thus far, can be understood in terms of a 
generalised concept of penalty for exit. The penalty may be 
directly imposed, but in most cases it is internalised'. 
'The applauded alert behaviour of the alerted consumer 
shifting to a better buy becomes disgraceful defection, 
desertion, and treason'.u
While in Exit Voice and Loyalty he regarded exit as 
essentially costless, when available, he later briefly 
discussed the potential costs of exit even in situations in 
which loyalty is absent.12 Such costs which are not evident 
in consumers' choices become more obvious for 
inter-industry transactions, (trust, traditions, etc.) and 
are crucial in all forms of territorial exit.
This short review points out the immense potential of 
Hirschman's concepts, and at the same time their limitation 
when applied outside and beyond the frame of reference of 
the modern territorial state, a frame which he takes for 
granted in his early work and only partially revised in its 
successive elaboration. To apply his conceptualisation to 




























































































any form of authority arena - see infra for this concept) 
some elaboration and modification is necessary.
New exits and 'partial exit'. Hirschman's main reference 
point is always the individual and his/her exit 
opportunities, and he sees the latter for within-state 
organisations. In fact, he defines 'stateless' as a 
situation associated with the regular practice and 
possibility of physical exit, which in turn is the cause of 
the non-emergence of large, centralised societies with 
specialised state organs (p. 251). In other words, exit 
option availability prevents the formation of modern 
differentiated states, which presumably rest on the 
limitations of such 'individual' exit.13 He is rarely 
concerned with other units of exit (corporations, 
territories) because this implies exit from the state, 
something that he tends to see in the classic terms of 
migration and secession.14 'Exit is ordinarily unthinkable, 
though not always wholly impossible, from such primordial 
human groupings as family, tribe, church, and state.'15
Even in his dealing with exit from and voice for public 
goods, the question is whether to exit or to voice within 
state organisations. Within this limitation, the problem is 
that for public goods the member can stop being a producer 
but not stop being a consumer. While exiting from an 
organisation providing private goods terminates the 
relationship, in the case of public goods one can stop 
producing them via the organisational effort (exiting the 
producing organisations: parties, pressure groups, etc.) 
but cannot exit entirely from them as a consumer of public 
goods. Calculations become more complex and basically 
involve evaluating the cost of voice from within (remaining 
a producer of public goods) or voice from outside (exit 




























































































about best public goods). As it is always subject to public 
good quality, the customer who exits cannot avoid caring 
about such goods and he/she may be convinced not to exit in 
order to prevent further deterioration of the product 
quality.
This alternative between, on the one hand, within-state 
organisations' exit/voice options, and, on the other hand, 
migration and secession from the state is too radical for 
my purposes. Particularly in the present conditions of 
growing 'internationalisation' there is a lot to be gained 
from attempting to apply Hirschman's conceptualisation in 
the grey area of exit/voice options which extends between 
these two extreme and clear-cut cases: that is, exit/voice 
options which are neither fully and exclusively based on 
individual physical mobility (although they rest on its 
increasing possibility) nor fully and exclusively based on 
territorial defection (although indeed resting on the 
increasing credibility of such an option). Moreover there 
might be 'partial' forms of exit as opposed to these 
'total' forms.
Hirschman conceives of exit as 'total exit': physically 
leaving a territory; seceding from a state; abandoning a 
membership organisation; stopping buying a good, etc. In 
these total exit examples everything is simultaneously 
withdrawn in one act. However, we need to conceive of 
'partial exits' which historically are of great 
importance.16 Within any form of authority arena there might 
exist or develop certain immunities, spatial or functional, 
into which the individual/corporation/group/territory can 
withdraw (the 'sanctuary' exit, the fugitive who is safe at 
the altar of the church, the Commune in the Middle Ages) . 
There might also be selective withholding of functions or 




























































































service, fiscal obligations; 'opting out'). Traditionally, 
certain regions were exempted from military services 
(Northern Ireland in W.W.II) or enjoyed extensive exception 
from taxation (e.g. Aragon as compared with Castillia in 
the Spanish Kingdom). For a long time, various communes and 
provinces, and certain 'orders' or 'classes' enjoyed 
exemption from taxation as territorial or functional 
islands.
Voice structuring. If intermediate and partial exit forms 
have to be considered to apply the concept to historical 
processes, voice too has to be revised and considered in a 
'stronger sense' than envisaged by Hirschman. For 
Hirschman, voice is an individualistic prerogative in a 
second sense: as exit, it is determined by purely 
individual resources. While a number of structural 
constraints are important in determining the balance of 
exit and voice for individual commodities (availability of 
close substitutes, numbers of buyers, durability and 
standardisation of the article, .and so forth), the 
propensity to resort to the voice option is mainly 
influenced, on the one hand, by the presence of exit 
alternatives that atrophy the development of the art of 
voice; on the other, by the presence of loyalty mechanisms 
and expressive motivations which may lower the cost of 
voice. Hirschman suggests that the range of voice options 
'depends also on the general readiness of a population to 
complain and on the invention of such institutions and 
mechanisms as can communicate complaints cheaply and 
effectively'17 but does not develop this point further. 
Institutions do not play a significant role in this 
picture, presumably because within the individualist 
perspective institutions themselves require voice to begin 




























































































The text where he comes closest to facing the issue of the 
passing from individualised voice to collective and 
structured voice is in his detailed recasting of the events 
leading to the collapse of the GDR.18 In this case, it 
becomes obvious that when exit is advocated collectively 
and not only practised individually, it naturally becomes a 
form of voice and the two get inevitably mixed and 
intertwined. It is somehow surprising to me that Hirschman 
finds this association or transformation of exit into voice 
as problematic and puzzling for his earlier schemes. He 
discusses how exit 'ignites' voice, but it is rather the 
lack of individual exit which ignites voice in the GDR 
events. Once private exit, rather than being silently 
practised, became publicly advocated it is ipso facto a 
public request and as such voice. This was obviously the 
result of the fact that too many people wanted to exit at 
the same time and that, as a consequence, they realised 
that the fulfilment of their individual expectations could 
no longer be hoped for without collective action.
From this recognition it seems almost unavoidable that one 
pass to a discussion of how voice is 'structured', that is, 
aggregated and made collective, and how much boundary 
building can influence this process. Although, obviously, 
voice remains an individual choice, its cost for the 
individual depends to a large extent on the level of 
structuration of organisations, movements and channels for 
the expression of complaints. Voice needs to be structured 
institutionally, in the dual sense that if it does not get 
structured it is unlikely to be heard, and that unless some 
structuring is achieved it cannot extend beyond highly 
motivated individuals to reach those for whom the initial 
costs are too high. The problem of voice structuring within 




























































































which has often underlined how institutions can lower the 
costs of voice (participation) for certain categories of 
individuals who would otherwise be passive.19
Voice, therefore, requires the creation of channels through 
which consumers of both private and public goods can 
communicate their complaints. The 'capacity to invent 
channels of communications' is the process of structuring 
complaints. We could reformulate Hirschman's point by 
arguing that the lower the opportunity for exit, the higher 
the propensity to invent institutions of complaint 
communication; i.e. the propensity to structure and 
institutionalise voice. The institutionalisation of voice 
is the result of repeated experiences of non-exit options 
and ineffective individual complaints. In other words, I am 
arguing that voice cannot simply be identified in a 
rhapsody of words -- even if this may temper a population's 
desire for action —  but has to be defined in a stronger 
sense, with a more complex set of political arrangements by 
which the deterioration of the organisation's performance 
can not only be brought to its attention, but also 
modified. Voice, in short, means effective machinery for 
the modification of organisational performance. It must 
consist of channels of expression as well as an arrangement 
of consent and redress and also potentially of tailoring 
administrative devices. Voice requires structures which 
help the ease the course from complaint to the demand for 
redress and modification.
Differential distribution of exit/voice options. Exit and 
voice are individuals' choices but their costs vary for 
each single individual so that opportunities are 
differentially available to different individuals, groups, 
territories, etc. Hirschman devotes considerable attention 




























































































an organisation's capacity to improve or redress 
performance. He draws two main conclusions from his 
analysis:
1) As long as the most aroused and therefore the 
potentially most vocal customers are the first to abandon 
it, voice is not an effective mechanism of recuperation. It 
would be an effective mechanism only under conditions of 
full monopoly, when the customers are securely locked in.
2) The possibility that the differential distribution of 
voice options and possibilities may lead the participants 
to influence the process of product modification and 
adjustment to their advantage, as the same mechanisms of 
voice produce a non representative sample of citizens' 
preferences.20
Note, however, that the parallel phenomenon may be more 
important: exit, opportunities and options are distributed 
in a non-equal and very differentiated way, and are not the 
same for all people for any given good, service or 
territory, etc.. This leaves open the possibility that the 
dissatisfied-mobiles -- those who might exit -- make the 
organisation particularly sensitive to their exigencies, 
and indeed so much so that it tries to anticipate the 
course of action which will prevent their exit.
However, at the abstract level the discussion of the 
differential options for exit and for voice cannot progress 
further. In reality the actual chances of exit for 
individuals, groups, corporations, etc. are defined by 
specific mechanisms and techniques of boundary building. It 
depends essentially on which boundaries are open or closed, 
and who or which group would enjoy which opportunities for 
exit. Institutional barriers to exit are set at all levels 
of social organisation and justified on various grounds, 




























































































credentials, to defending useful social institutions, etc.. 
Some of these boundaries may even be justified on the 
grounds that they serve to stimulate voice in 
deteriorating, yet recuperable organisations which would be 
prematurely destroyed through free exit.
The conclusion is that to give a historically specific 
content to the implications of the differential potential 
for exit of a broad set of actors, one needs to develop 
some sort of theory of institutional boundary building. 
Without such theory of boundaries, the speculations about 
consequences of differential distribution of exit (or 
voice) options remain fairly abstract, mostly linked to the 
general factor of the attitudinal orientation of the actor 
towards the 'quality of the product'.
Voice against exit. Voice may be paralysed by the exit of 
the potentially most interested. Such exit may help the 
local monopolist not to respond. However, voice could also 
be fostered by such exit if proper channels are available. 
That is, those who cannot exit may become vocal about their 
lack of such opportunity or about the indirect costs of 
other people's exit. Hirschman argues that exit only 
damages the possibility of responding by voice in the 
micro- and macro-terms spelled out above: that is, for the 
individual -- for whom exit opportunity lowers the interest 
in voice; and for the whole organisation -- for which exit 
options may lower the level or the quality of overall 
voice. In other words, he does not doubt that, if voice 
exists, it is a redressing mechanism, irrespective of the 
level to which exit exists. Put differently, he does not 
conceive of 'voice against exit' .
The exit of some may depress the overall voice by affecting 




























































































capacity. But there is a second possibility: the exit of 
some may generate the voice of others. Exit undermines the 
voice of those who (can) exit, but what does it do to those 
who do not want or cannot exit? In the GDR case, the mass 
exodus contributed considerably to the voice of the loyal 
Germans who wanted not to exit but to stay (wir bleiben 
hier) and were worried by others' desire to exit. Hirschman 
interprets this process via the concept of loyalty: those 
unburdened by feelings of loyalty will be prone to exit, 
whilst those with loyalty will resort to voice. In the 
German case, however, there were two vocal groups: a) 
those who were loyal and did not want to exit (although 
they might do so); b) and those who had no loyalty 
feelings, would have liked to exit but could not do so, and 
felt negatively affected by the exit options of the others.
In concrete, the model needs to be applied to a more 
complex differentiation of groups and individuals, 
imagining that the options of some are not without impact 
on the options of others, and that the exit choice may well 
provoke reactions of voice in those who do not possess or 
who do not want to use this option. In other words, 
inequality of exit, on top of its consequences for 
organisational performance, may also be a source of 
conflict within a given organisation. How much exit should 
be allowed from an organisation could be considered in many 
cases as a controversial internal issue to the extent to 
which the organisation itself can control its membership 
boundaries. Lots of organisations, from professional orders 
to territorial entities, actually do have such power to a 
greater or lesser extent, and considerable controversy 
surrounds the management of their boundaries. Naturally, 
before organisational consolidation has occurred, exit 
opportunities may simply prevent such consolidation; but 




























































































exit options have to be regarded as the basis for potential 
conflicts among those who want to restrict those options 
and those who want to open them up. The latter realise that 
the exit options of the others 1) are precluded to them; 2) 
increase the internal resources of the potential exiters 
beyond their capacity to voice; and, last but not least, 3) 
may considerably reduce the resources and possibilities of 
success of internal voice by materially subtracting the 
resources necessary for responding to voice. The quality of 
schooling in suburbs is affected when the richer and most 
educated citizens leave, not only because those schools 
lose the most likely vocal defenders of quality standards, 
but also because they may lose the material resources 
through which a certain qualitative standard was guaranteed 
also to those who could not otherwise afford it.
One may expect that within an authority arena the most 
advanced, core and outward oriented individuals, groups and 
territories will be the ideological defenders of the 
openness of the organisation, while the more immobile and 
peripheral may be the centre of anti-openness ideology
Organisational hierarchy. A final elaboration concerns the 
role and the strategy of organisational hierarchies. They 
are not explicitly dealt with in Hirschman's work, where he 
tends to assume that they will be more or less forced to 
respond to environmental challenges coming either from exit 
or voice or both, when available. Yet there is at least one 
sense in which exit opportunities affect the organisational 
hierarchies strategy: in the presence of high opportunities 
for exit it is likely that organisational leadership will 
find it easier to resist, evade, and postpone the 
development of mechanisms for responding to voice. Voice in 
a strong sense, as indicated before, may be difficult to 
channel, organise and discipline in organisations which 




























































































means that 'voice against exit' may be justified 
normatively as a defence of voice effectiveness.
In conclusion, I have argued that a richer variety of exit 
options, a stronger concept of voice, and a more elaborate 
relationship between exit/voice inequalities and internal 
conflict generation must be conceptualised. 'Voice 
structuring' and 'boundary building' are two essential 
components to be added to the exit/voice theory if one 
wants to apply it historically:
1) in a perfect and costless exit community or 
organisation, no structuring of voice will be necessary and 
indeed attempted (most of the markers, notwithstanding 
consumers' associations etc.);
2) some sort of 'closure' (that is, institutional exit 
limitation) is necessary for voice, not to express 
generally, but rather to structure via movements, 
institutions, routine practices, etc.;
3) boundary building mechanisms define the conditions of 
institutional closure which are at the same time exit (from 
existing boundaries) and closure (in new boundaries);
4) which boundaries are set up and which are removed 
decides who and which resources can exit or not and helps 
the historical and social definitions of exiters and 
voicers in a concrete case.
4. Boundary building and boundary removing
At the most general level exit is the crossing of an 
established boundary. Boundaries are of different types in 
different areas; they may be emotional and affective, 
social and cultural, legal, etc.. Systems whose membership 
is limited by spatially identifiable boundaries are 





























































































Boundaries define the level of closure of various social 
relationships within and across authority arenas.21 The 
conditions for the exit options are therefore set by the 
processes of internal and external boundary building of the 
latter. To the extent that they close a given social 
relationship, boundaries determine a clear distinction 
between the 'ins' and the 'outs', and this criteria of 
exclusion is based on unequal access to rewards, resources 
and opportunities, no matter what the basis for unequal 
access is.22 In fact, the closure practices which derive 
from boundary setting can develop along various criteria: 
lineage, property, education, credentials, power and force, 
status, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, language, etc., 
and on the basis of different rules or codes of closure. 
Only certain boundaries and the corresponding exclusion 
rules are backed by the legal apparatuses of the state.
Boundaries define collectivist and individualistic criteria 
of exclusion and closure.23 Collectivist criteria of 
exclusion are directly responsible for the transmission of 
advantage to other members of the group (e.g. family 
descendants, lineage, caste, race, religion, ethnicity and 
state membership). Individualistic criteria (property, 
power, credentials, achievements) are equally designed to 
protect advantages, but are less efficient than 
collectivist criteria in transmitting such advantage to the 
descendant or next generation or group members. A long term 
tendency can be identified for collectivist criteria of 
exclusion to be replaced by individualist criteria of 
exclusion in Western culture.
Positing the distinction between boundaries and associated 
closure rules and codes within a given territorial 




























































































rules and codes between territorial systems, I can 
reformulate the distinction made earlier between the 
demarcation of external boundaries of geographical space 
and the differentiation of roles in the internal 
organisation of the population occupying this physical 
space. At the same time, this assumes a strong relationship 
between the type of external boundaries and the means 
through which they are set up, on the one hand, and the 
same processes for internal boundaries, on the other hand.
Let us first look at types of external boundaries of 
territorial systems. In Table 1 I present a scheme of such 
boundaries which distinguish membership according to 
different criteria.
(Table 1 about here)
The table identifies four dimensions of boundary building 
among units in the economic, cultural, force and politico- 
administrative domains. Unfortunately, we do not have 
established names for these different types of boundaries. 




























































































Table 1: Types of territorial boundaries






































































































































































concept of 'closure code and rule', I might suggest other 
names to clarify the distinction and to avoid the tedious 
and continuous repetition of 'cultural boundary', 'economic 
boundary', etc. We might call the economic boundary a 
'fringe'; the cultural boundary a 'margin', the military- 
coercion boundary a 'frontier' and the politico- 
administrative boundary a 'border'. Alternatively we could 
use some of the Latin rich terminology for the same 
concept.24 However, these neologisms are rarely accepted and 
they often increase, rather than dissipate, 
misunderstanding. What I want to underline by this 
insistence on the terminological difference is the fact 
that one needs to keep these different boundaries as 
distinct as possible at the conceptual level.
The process of market building and the formation of 
economic boundaries has its focal point in the openness of 
transactions in a given geographical area and in the 
necessary correlates of property rights agreements, 
exchange options and factor mobility. The cultural 
boundaries define a membership space characterised by the 
traits of the inhabitants (language, religion, ethnicity, 
national identity, etc.). In principle, as we know, 
cultural identities are not necessarily concentrated 
geographically. However, I am interested here in the vast 
majority of historical cases in which some sort of 
territorial concentration and the cultural identity of the 
individual is defined and reinforced by the continuous 
interaction in the geographical space with the cultural 
equivalent. The 'force' boundaries define that geographical 
space within which a single central authority exercises its 
ultimate right to the physical coercion of the subjected 
population. The politico-administrative boundaries identify 
those primarily legal boundaries which differentiate among 




























































































educational systems, welfare regimes, labour markets, 
courts' jurisdictions, etc..
It is difficult to think of these boundaries as 
analytically distinct for a variety of reasons. The first 
and more obvious is that our daily experience and our 
historical memory refer to a situation of large, if not 
complete, overlap of these different boundaries. The modern 
nation-state successfully integrated these boundary­
building processes. Nation-states of the European type are 
characterised by boundaries which are simultaneously 
military, economic, cultural and functional. Crossing the 
boundary of the state one passes, at the same time, into 
the Imperium of alternative extractive agencies, into a 
different economic market, into a different cultural 
community and into a different set of functional regimes as 
educational systems, welfare state, legal jurisdictions, 
and so forth. This (territorial) coincidence of different 
type boundaries has been their distinctive trait —  which 
distinguishes them from earlier or different forms of 
politische Verbände -- and their legitimacy principle. The 
modern nation-state is based, therefore, on a collectivist 
criterion of exclusion meant to monopolise certain 
advantages for the members of the state groups, in various 
but coinciding functional areas, along which citizens' 
rights and obligations are sharply distinguished from the 
rights and obligations of 'foreigners'. Such type of state 
may be subject to the decline of this collectivistic 
exclusion and become more universalistic.
The second reason why it is difficult to conceive these 
boundaries as separate is that, while we can easily 
construct the ideal type of their coincidence -- i.e. the 
ideal type of the sovereign, unitary, autarchic and 




























































































identify pure cases of each type of boundary. The 
primordial hunter-gatherer community had primarily cultural 
boundaries, as kinship links set almost insurmountable 
barriers to externals in all fields; but for long time it 
did not possess a distinct territoriality. A pure 
force/coercion/extractive boundary is represented by those 
'imperial' territorial hierarchies which encompassed 
different cultural groups and included substantially closed 
different market areas. The Roman Empire had a clear 
perception of where its limes -- its military borders —  
lay and where its civitas -- Roman citizenship -- ended. 
Furthermore, between limes and civitas there were several 
additional intermediate borders, for instance the politico- 
administrative borders of militarily subject populations 
which were left to run their internal matters according to 
their traditions and rules. Pure market boundaries existed 
beyond political administrative borders in those free-trade 
areas which encompassed city networks, such as the 
Hanseatic League, within which the respect of basic 
economic rights was guaranteed across cultural, military, 
and politico-administrative borders.25
The third reason is that when we analytically separate 
these boundaries we are left with no names to indicate the 
situations of their non matching. These lacks of 
coincidence have existed, and will continue to exist even 
if we are not able to properly label them. However, it is 
true that unless we name something we are unable to 
conceptualise it. Stat rosa pristina nominem. Nomina nuda 
ten emus. More precisely we are familiar and we are able to 
label the situation of areas and/or groups for which 
force/coercion and politico-administrative territorial 
claims are incongruent with cultural identities: we call 
these 'cultural peripheries' and we distinguish between 




























































































peripheries —  according to whether the cultural stigmata 
defining the area or group find support across the 
politico-administrative border or not —  or 'enclave 
cultural peripheries' —  whether they are surrounded or not 
by the central dominant cultural community.26 It is more 
difficult to conceive and label those situations in which 
economic and politico-administrative borders or economic 
and cultural borders do not coincide: the case in which 
economic rights are spread across a politico-administrative 
border -- that is, a territory in which politico- 
administrative rights are incongruent with the economic 
rights and transactions; and the case in which cultural 
identities are incongruent with economic markets rights —  
that is, a territory in which community membership space is 
incongruent with economic transactions and rights.21
Along each of these territorial boundaries the development 
of rules and codes of closure may set boundaries or their 
decline may remove boundaries. At the same time, new 
technologies for exit may actually force the removal of 
boundaries. In short, for each dimension exit options and 
boundary building interact. In Table 2,28 the type of exit 
options and boundary building are summarised for each main 
subsystem.
(Table 2 about here)
These boundaries define sets of cross-boundary transactions 
and sets of control measures. The (potential) units of 
these transactions and control in different subsystems are 
goods and services, corporations, physical persons, 
messages, territories and even 'roles'. For each subsystem 




























































































Table 2: Exit options and boundary building
exit option units boundary building mechanisms
economy -goods - embargoes
-services - tariffs
- tourists - labour-market controls
- corporations - credit/capital controls




-fashion, fads - censorship
-scribes, scientists - loyalty-building rites/symbols





force/ - soldiers, armies
coercion/ - police - territorialisation of defence
extraction -spies - territorialisation of policing
-underground movements - borders controls
-organised crime - territorial extraction system
- tax - restriction on residence
- territorial 
secession
- restrictions on travelling
politico- - voters - protection of citizenship
administra - candidates - national specific social rights
-tive - legal claimants - professional credential codes
(functio- (judges/cases) - national jurisdiction
nal - sub-state governments - national educational
regimes) - students





























































































time, boundary building mechanisms. As specific 
'technologies' for exit may continuously develop, they 
generate pressures on existing boundaries. On the other 
hand, history also provides a continuous invention or re- 
invention of boundary building mechanisms.
The various works of Stein Rokkan on the geo-political 
model of European development try to work out the linkages 
between the strategies for differential external control 
and the consequences of such strategies for the 
configurations of political resources inside each 
territory. He initially started from the study of European 
party system formation during the 19th and early 20th 
century; that is, studying a specific process of political 
structuring.29 However, the study of the structuring of 
cleavage systems and party oppositions was done within 
established nation states, although since the beginning it 
included rich references to the previous processes of state 
and nation formation. For this reason he later decided that 
in order to better understand within-state political­
structuring, he had to devote itself more intensely to the 
study of the processes of state and nation formation. His 
overall model, scattered in so many publications, is 
therefore re-elaborated as a model of the (historical) 
interaction between external and internal boundary-building 
strategies in the history of the organisation of the 
different territorial systems.
In his analysis of the possible linkages between 'external 
boundary differentiation' and the 'opening up of internal 
channels for voice' he singled out a number of consequences 
for his démocratisation process these consequences 
concerned. His analysis of 'social inputs' for the 
structuring of party systems and of the institutional 




























































































main partisan oppositions —  and gave much less attention 
to corporate interests and social movements30 —  and was 
largely confined to the final structuring of conflicts and 
institutional démocratisation of highly closed nation-state 
systems. To profit from his insights and to apply them to 
different historical situations I need first to elaborate 
in somewhat more abstract terms the process of 
structuration and then to start to wonder what shape this 
structuration would begin to take, if any, in the context 
of different boundary compositions, coincidence, looseness 
and, consequently in the opening up of wider exit options.
5. Political structuring
Discussing Hirschman's framework I have argued the reasons 
why we need to conceive of voice as the articulation, 
mobilisation, organisation of individual voice propensities 
and as the setting up of arrangements for consent and 
redress. Even for those who are inclined to invest personal 
resources in voice options, voice requires structuring, 
identity and in particular collective identity, and also 
requires some organisation plus symbolic elaboration of the 
collective goal. I have labelled this as the process of 
'political structuring' of a territorial community. 
Provided some original hierarchical authority exists, such 
a process of political structuring progresses along two 
dimensions and is composed of two sub-processes:
1) voice structuring = articulation, mobilisation,
organisation of individual voice;
2) institutional differentiation = arrangement of consent 
and redress. By 'voice structuring' is meant the political 
'vertebration' of the community; 'institutional
differentiation' indicates the role and function 





























































































Discussing the process of closure and of boundary building, 
I have stressed the close connection between these two 
processes of internal political differentiation and the 
corresponding processes of external boundary building in 
different functional subsystems. It is too simple to 
conceive of an almost automatic transfer of the absence of 
exit options into voice activity; a theory of political 
structuring needs to be elaborated which is sufficiently 
general and abstract in its language and theoretical 
linkages to encompass processes which go beyond known 
within-state structuring' and include the more general 
'large-scale territory structuring'.
Contrary to natural arenas, as a field in which the power 
of each actor closely corresponds to the level and use of 
only his/her own resources, an authority arena is a field 
in which the power guaranteed to the social actor depends 
on the role and the function of a third actor installed to 
the central hierarchical organisation.31 In other words, an 
authority arena (any authority arena: from the state to the 
professional order) is an arena endowed with an actor and a 
function (institution) specialised in the production of 
behavioural conformity.32 The public goods distributed 
through this specialised function may be wider or 
restricted in type and scope in different cases and 
historical periods, but they normally include at least some 
protection (defence from others' offence through coercive 
sanctions); arbitration (control and limitation of the 
conflicts among qualified actors); jurisdiction (guarantees 
about the compliance to the commitments taken by social 
actors and their respect of the services and performances 
promised and dues); regulation (definition of the rules of 
the game); allocation (direct allocation of goods, 
services, duties) (later in the text referred to as P-A-J- 




























































































capacity, scope and effectiveness of this production of 
public goods is fundamentally dependent on the control of 
the boundaries between the authority arenas and other 
authority arenas. The higher the control of the transaction 
across authority arenas, in principle the more extensive 
and effective is the capacity of autonomous production of 
public goods and the higher the capacity of the internal 
hierarchy to stabilise and legitimise its domination 
position. Therefore, the incentive of internal 
structuration of any authority arena (including the 
territorial systems I concentrate on in this paper) is also 
a function of this external closure and of the internal 
hierarchy scope and reach in the production of public 
goods.
Why does the closedness of a system produce internal 
structuring of the voice? The process of internal political 
structuring is not a purely imposed or coercive process due 
to the mere closure of exit options. This is indeed a 
precondition, in the sense that as argued, when exit 
options are maximum, internal voice is unlikely to be 
structured. Yet, even when exit options are limited or 
unavailable, the process of structuring which is more 
likely to occur develops also as a result of internal 
processes. Let me advance three points.
External closure and politicising of the internal closure 
rules and codes. Strengthening external territorial 
boundaries in one or more of the subsystems increases the 
development of internal exclusion roles and codes. As a 
matter of fact, internal closure rules and codes postulate 
the overall closure of territorial boundaries. Given that 
within each territorial unit the development of internal 




























































































based on unequal access to rewards, resources and 
opportunities (lineage, property, education, credential, 
power and force, status, race, ethnicity, gender, religion, 
language, etc.) and progresses through the recognition and 
legitimation of these criteria of exclusion as operated by 
the P-A-J-R-A policies of the hierarchical order, within 
each authority arena (and particularly in those of a 
territorial type), the political structuring takes place by 
politicising some closure rules and practices and by 
representing and organising interests around the defence of 
or the challenges to the monopolisation of certain 
positions.
Resource convertibility. The more the boundaries of an 
authority arena are closed and coincide, the more the 
resources within the system become 'convertible' one into 
the other. In closed systems the demands and the resources 
of the 'periphery' (cultural, economic and politico- 
administrative) are addressed to the centre and get 
converted into power resources at the centre. Similarly, 
social group identities and interest definitions are 
converted, if the system is closed, into elements of the 
central battle for control and power. If a system is open, 
whatever resources are accumulated by territories, groups, 
individuals etc. cannot be converted directly into centre 
resources, because concerned units can refuse to engage in 
the battle or confrontation over those resources; that is, 
they can exit. The centralisation of resources and 
convertibility of various resources (economic power, group 
identity, mass organisation, political or social movements) 
is possible only to the extent that the boundaries are 
sufficiently closed to create a 'system', that is to 
prevent actors from considering the option of not 




























































































'converting' their resources into the power struggle at the 
centre.
Systemic interaction. Political structuring is an 
interactive process resulting from the systemic interaction 
(conflictual, co-operative, competitive, negotiational) of 
parts and elements which feel the impossibility of exiting 
the system. When this possibility of exit is perceived as 
real, the game is different. Calculations always compare 
options of voice structuring with options of directing the 
resources available towards other systems or outside and 
against the structuring system. If political structuring 
takes place through the progressive formation of front 
lines, of political alliances between groups of political 
entrepreneurs, corporate interests organisations, social 
groups, political movements and organisations, one basic 
rule is that the pre-existing or already existing alliances 
of the in-groups shape the possibilities for alliance of 
the out-groups. The process occurs through alliances which 
reduce and shrink the space for alternative alliances and 
counter-alliances. Once a given number of individuals, 
groups, territories or firms is locked in a specific 
authority arena from which it can not easily escape, the 
process of internal voice structuring produces rising 
performances and a stabilisation of behavioural patterns 
'path-dependant'. In other words, the external closure 
tends to favour a system of internal rules -- a structure; 
at the same time actors accumulate experience, develop 
specific competencies within the institutional framework 
and also personal interests, and values and identities are 
defined during this process of structuring. The processes 
of external closure trigger off processes of internal 
learning and of internal redefinition of interests and 
identities which are a function of the accepted or 




























































































structure. This process is mutual in the sense that, once 
external boundaries are closed, internal groups redefine 
their position, interests and values as a function of their 
being locked in the system and being therefore obliged to 
interact with the other, similarly locked-in actors. The 
external closure defines and imposes systemic interaction 
which itself defines identities and interests in terms of 
the compelling and compulsory relationships among internal 
groups.
In a situation of low boundaries and, therefore, 
generalised and costless exit options, there would be no 
need and probably no attempt at political structuration. 
The protection, arbitration, jurisdiction, regulation and 
allocation of the authority arena's central hierarchy would 
necessarily be extremely limited. To ascertain preferences 
through a political process based on some form of voice 
(voting, group action, pluralism, etc.) may become 
irrelevant. Citizens' preferences can be more effectively 
revealed by the consumer (of public policies) moving to the 
authority arena whose government package best satisfies 
his/her set of preferences. In other words, rather than 
have a given and pre-defined population and a government 
which tries to adjust its policies in terms of revenue, 
expenditure and tax to the population's preferences, 
governments could decide on a certain level of revenue and 
expenditure in order to attract consumers.33
In this situation, kings and states will have to compete by 
offering their services (i.e. the services of governing) so 
as to attract the greatest number of buyers in the form of 
taxpayers. Again, in this situation, the P-A-J-R-A policies 
would be primarily driven not by some form of political 
decision making but by the central hierarchy's guess about 




























































































terms of the desired quality and quantity of authority- 
arena public good production.
The 'full-exit' world is, therefore, a world in which there 
is no voice. Time is no longer spent in trying to convince 
the rulers to change their minds and policies. None would 
be able to force those with resources to share their 
resources with others through the development of political 
coalitions. No complex procedural techniques have to be 
developed to weight and combine the preferences of the 
affected, actually revealed by their 'walking out'.
Obviously this conclusion is based on the assumption that 
all subjects can and are willing to exit. Those people who 
cannot or who do not want to exit are not contemplated. If 
we do contemplate them, we must take into consideration 
that some people may believe that in order to realise their 
claims and values they need to close the social 
relationships and the corresponding border. Then, one needs 
to consider the political reactions of the immobile or of 
the less mobile.34
The historical plausibility of the full and generalised 
exit options model is irrelevant in this context35 as it 
offers a clear picture of the internal political 
structuring implications of absence of the closure rule and 
boundaries. At the opposite side of the spectrum, the 
completely closed authority arena sets up such impermeable 
boundaries that the convertibility of resources, the 
raising of performances and a stabilisation of behavioural 
patterns and systemic interactions facilitate forms of 
internal institutionalisation of voice mechanisms, 
structures and channels. In between these two extreme 
cases, the process of boundary differentiation in various 




























































































perceptions, the interests and the values of different 
individuals, groups, etc., and provide for varying and 
different opportunities to structure voice.
Institutional differentiation of the internal hierarchical 
order is the second corner of the process of political 
structuring. If we want to keep our language at a high 
level of generality and abstraction we should not specify 
which type of institutional differentiation we are 
considering. We may leave aside the more traditional, 
purely ascriptive mechanisms of protection, arbitration, 
regulation, jurisdiction and allocation within the 
authority arena. One major type is of course the 
bureaucratic type, characterised by regulation by 'experts' 
or by people whose major qualification is some specific 
knowledge. These experts are in turn supervised to some 
extent by holders of the authority arena control, but only 
to a very little extent directly by the clients to whom 
they provide their services. The bureaucratic 'ideal type' 
stresses the 'rational' computational allocation and 
decision making which is worked out 'rationally' according 
to the exigencies of any given situation and belittles 
allocation by elected representatives, by organs of 
self-government, through processes of political or 
legislative decision or by exigencies of the impersonal 
mechanism of the market.36
If we want to be more specific, in this part of the world 
and in this era, the form of institutional differentiation 
of the authority arena which we are talking about is 
'institutional démocratisation'. In this 'representative' 
or 'public' type, the principles at least of protection, 
arbitration, jurisdiction, regulation and allocation are 
established by the public deliberation of 'representatives' 




























































































representatives, voluntary association, professional 
organisations, etc.) whose powers are defined by procedural 
principles and rules (such as one-person-one-vote; majority 
decision; appointment and revocability of executives).
In Table 3 the two components of political structuring are 
briefly summarised. The items in this table could be more 
historically specific. One could speak of protest, revolt 
and socio-political movements instead of 'aggregate voice'; 
of political membership organisations and of courts, 
parliaments and estate representation, rather than of 
structured voice. Institutional threshold could specify 
electoral inclusiveness, equality and fairness, majority 
rights control, executives' responsibility, etc.. Here I 
prefer to keep a fairly general connotative terminology, 
simply pointing out that voice may range from pious prayer 
to the direct exercise of majority rights, and in parallel 
to this, institutional differentiation may involve more or 
less complex mechanisms of hearing, consent and redress. 
This in turn allows the application of the scheme to 
historical phases and actors different from those which 
developed as a result of the combined effect of the 
industrial and political revolution of the, 18th century.
(Table 3 about here)
If we limit our discussion to the within-state developments 
of the modern era, the precise timing of voice structuring 
and institutional démocratisation is crucial. Some polities 









































































































- mechanisms of voluntary listening
- guarantee or right to be heard
- arrangements of consent
- arrangements of redress
- arrangements of modification




























































































démocratisation much before voice was extensively and 
effectively structured, as the British example reminds us. 
The same could be said for the France of the Second and 
Third Republic where institutional démocratisation ran 
ahead of the voice structuration of the community (parties 
and corporate groups and the establishment of solid central 
alliances between them).31 On the other side, a polity could 
be strongly structured from the political point of view, 
but non institutionally democratised. German society was 
highly politically mobilised and structured as of the 
1860s but it was not until the 1920s that political 
démocratisation followed. In much the same way, Norwegian 
and Swedish societies were characterised by the historical 
presence of strong socio-political popular movements 
throughout the entire 19th century, while important 
institutional barriers to démocratisation (irresponsible 
government and above all second house privileges) persisted 
up to the beginning of the 20th century. Under these 
conditions, a polity can clearly be neither institutionally 
democratised nor politically structured (see Figure 2) ,38
(Figure 2 about here)
Figure 3 sums up the relationship I have tried to establish 
at the general level between external boundary building, 
exit options, and internal political structuring of every 
authority arena (included those of a territorial nature).
The early boundary building which is implied by the same 
formation of a new authority arena increases the cost of 
exit of the internal membership group. Of course, the early 
boundaries may develop in a limited functional domain. For 
instance, the early efforts at territorial state formation 
in Europe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century 


























































































































































































coercion boundaries, while in cultural, economic and 
politico-administrative terms a variety of internal and 
cross-border boundaries continued to exist. However, if and 
when the central hierarchy of the authority arena manages 
to strengthen its territorial control by raising new 
boundaries for goods, persons, messages, rights, 
credentials, etc. in new functional areas and making them 
progressively coincide with the territorial and/or 
membership space, exit options tend to collapse.
(Figure 3 about here)
What sort of boundaries tend to be raised and strengthened 
determines what sort of internal closure and exclusion 
rules and codes develop, are supported or opposed by the 
internal hierarchy, and get politicised. That is, as 
already stressed, the type of boundary building influences 
the type of internal structuring.
Early boundary building should not reduce the cost of 
voice. On the contrary, the same process of boundary 
consolidation may imply boundary insecurity, external 
pressure, internal voice repression, invocation of abstract 
ideals of authority legitimation and therefore voice- 
indifferent ideologies (for instance 'competence', or the 
'nation', or 'class' or 'efficiency').
When external boundaries are consolidated, economic 
interest differentiation, cultural diversities and 
institutional privileges engender processes of internal 
political structuring of the authority arena which tend to 
considerably lower the cost of voice whilst at the same 
time keeping the cost of exit high, and perhaps increasing 
it to the extent that the process generates and strengthens 
































































































































































































exit' allows the concentration and centralisation of 
resources and conflicts essential to the structuring of 
authority arenas.
If we read the curve in Figure 3 starting from the opposite 
end, the process involves the same phenomena, but in an 
inverse relationship. Removing or lowering boundaries -- as 
a deliberate choice or as a result of new exit technologies 
—  lowers the cost of exit for some people, resources, 
roles in the cultural, economic and politico-administrative 
spheres (e.g. world economy, international co-operation, 
new technologies etc.). Boundary fading increases the cost 
of voice. To begin with this happens because there are less 
resources looked in the authority arena. Moreover, all the 
processes which produce voice structuring —  resource 
convertibility, system interactions, rising performances 
and stabilisation of behavioural patterns -- affect the 
possibility and capacity to politicise the internal closure 
rules and codes. The mobility of factors limits the voice 
options of the non-mobiles. Finally, as a consequence, 
these processes tend to de-structure the historically 
existing structures of voice, whose main problem becomes a 
growing legitimacy crisis due to their incapability of 
channelling and satisfying demands and of controlling the 
environment. Lacking the appropriate resource control, 
opposition and conflicts find it difficult to structure at 
the central level. It does not make sense to compete 
functionally at the centre of the authority arena when 
there are no resources to be distributed there. Political 
organisations in this case can tend to become diluted in a 
less authoritative environment.39
As closure and structuration are linked theoretically, the 





























































































nucleus of a theory of boundary-building and political 
structuring and exit-options and political de-structuring.
However, boundaries and the corresponding exit-voice 
options are not only raised or lowered for existing units. 
Exiting something always means entering something else. In 
different functional areas, boundaries are moved to higher 
more encompassing territorial and membership authority 
arenas, or they may be narrowed down to retrenched 
territorial and membership arenas. Attempts at new boundary 
building at higher or lower levels may be helped by the 
same fact that actors and authorities at one level feel 
incapable of defending those boundaries at that level.
6. Europe: de te fabula narratur?
I should have been writing about 'europeanisation and 
domestic politics'. But didn't I?
Various sources tell us the story of Abulgualid Mohammed 
Ibn-Ahmed Ibn-Mohammed Ibn-Rushd better known to the
Western world as Averroe. In Cordoba in the middle of the 
twelfth century, while writing his comment on Aristotle's 
work which delivered his name to history, he kept wondering 
what the terms 'tragedy' and 'comedy' could mean. He 
finally concluded that Aristotle called 'tragedy' the art 
of eulogising, and 'comedy' the art of satire and anathema. 
Within the Islam -- which did not know of theatres 
nothing and nobody could help Abulgualid Mohammed Ibn- 
Ahmed' s interpretative effort. With a certain poetic 
licence, I can imagine him wondering about these meanings 
whilst walking on the ruined stones of the Roman theatre of 
the magnificent city of Cordoba.
Studying European integration we walk over the ruins of 




























































































world, whose significance is not, however, foreclosed to us 
by insurmountable cultural meaning boundaries. The half-a- 
century of European integration development is a long term 
process of new large-scale territorial differentiation 
characterised by the progressive lowering of internal 
boundaries and the slow rising of external new boundaries. 
The process liberates conflicting and contradictory 
energies and requests of exit and, at the same time, new 
demands of closure. This is the simple conclusion for which 
this paper constitutes the theoretical underpinning.
Which specific systemic boundaries are lowered internally 
and which ones are raised externally is and will be of 
paramount importance for affecting the forms of internal 
processes of voice structuring and institutional 
differentiation (démocratisation). It is very unlikely 
that the forms of political structuring prevalent at the 
national-state level will be simply reproduced within the 
larger authority arena. As usual, the specificity of the 
new processes which develop under our eyes1' seem so many and 
momentous as to defeat any comparison with previous 
historical phenomena of the same genus. And yet the entire 
history of Europe, from the consolidation of the Roman 
Empire to its fall, from f eudalisation to the birth of 
communal civilisation, from the establishment of a common 
Latin intellectual language to the vernacularisation of 
communication (and back to a new common language?) ; from 
the original kinship ties to the Christian cross­
territorial community and back to the religious membership 
retrenchment of orthodox and Protestant reforms, is a 
continuous process of geographical and membership space 
retrenchment/differentiation and expansion/integration. I 
find it fascinating to read the richness of this history 
through the glasses of 'exit option', 'boundary building' 




























































































interpret the European integration with the same 
intellectual tools.
This paper should have therefore continued with three 
further sections, which I shall mention to indicate the 
direction in which I am pursuing my work
1) European territorial and membership 'expansion- 
retrenchment'
where the framework delineated above should be applied to a 
number of critical junctures in European history and in 
particular to the formation of nation-states.
2) The European Union: exit options and boundary building
where I should analyse in more detail which boundary- 
removing, boundary-redrawing and boundary-building 
processes have developed through the half-a-century of 
European community development.
3) The European Union: Political structuring?
where the corresponding possibilities and forms of internal 
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A theoretical formulation of such a situation was elaborated by 
Charles Tiebout , 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure', Journal of 
Political Economy, 1956, pp. 416-424 concerning local government 
expenditures and tax levels, and by many others after him. The model 
is based on a considerable number of assumptions, namely (1) full 
mobility; 2) full knowledge of available revenue-expenditure packages; 
3) high number of such packages offered; 4) non-localised production; 
5) no spill-over effect of the public goods provided; 6) optimum size 
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given package can be provided at the lowest cost.
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certain aspects of the first phase of state-building in Western 
Europe', Social Science Information, 13, 1914, pp. 79-126.
38 Dahl's inspiration is obvious in this table. See R. A. Dahl, 
Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition, New Haven-London, Yale 
University Press, 1971. He refers to the two dimensions of 
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